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ABSTRACT 
The last ninety years of Kurdish history demonstrates 
their political progression towards statehood.  Examination 
of this history and US policy during this period allows us 
to analyze the circumstances that prevented Kurdish 
statehood.  The three levels of analysis utilized allows 
analysis of Kurdish history with regards to the individual, 
the state and the international system.  Such analysis 
assists in determining the prospect for independence of the 
Iraqi Kurds today. 
An Iraqi Kurdish declaration of independence would 
directly influence U.S. foreign policy for the Middle East.  
American policy decisions would depend upon the effects of 
other foreign policy objectives for the region.  
Recognition of Kurdish sovereignty is a policy decision 
that requires analysis of Kurdish history within the 
context of US foreign policy objectives. 
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I. PURPOSE/RESEARCH QUESTION   
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution 
of the prospects for an independent Kurdistan during the 
last century.  Since the institution of the no-fly zone 
over Northern Iraq in 1991 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
significant political progress has been made by the Kurds 
of Iraq.  The probability of ongoing ethnic and religious 
strife within Iraq creates an opportunity for the Kurdish 
nationalists to realize their aspirations and declare 
independence.  The impact of such a declaration, and how 
the United States should respond, is of great importance, 
not just in Iraq, but in other culturally diverse states as 
well.1 
This thesis addresses four questions:   
1. Have the Kurds gained enough political maturity 
to assert viable claims to independence?   
2. What level of permissiveness for an independent 
Kurdistan exists among the regional powers?    
3. What is the possibility that the Iraqi Kurds will 
declare independence from Iraq?   
4. How should the United States shape its foreign 
policy in the event of such a declaration?   
 
 
                     
1 Example of such states within the region include Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Turkey. 
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To frame answers to these questions, the thesis will 
review Kurdish history during the last century.  This 
background is crucial to understanding diplomatic options 
for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in addressing 
the issue of independence.  The concluding chapter assess 
whether an independent Kurdish state is consisistent with 
U.S. foreign policy objectives.  While Kurdish independence 
does not rely upon United States’ permission or support, 
cooperation with the U.S. and careful diplomacy with 
regional actors are of vital importance to the promotion 
and maintenance of stability in the region.2 
 
A. WHY THE DISCUSSION OF PROSPECTIVE KURDISH STATEHOOD IS 
IMPORTANT  
  
There are two reasons why this thesis is important.  
First, the success of the Iraqi Kurds in their attempt to 
maintain autonomy and/or gain independence is a direct 
concern to the national security of its neighboring 
countries, particularly Turkey.  Second, since 1991, the 
United States has been the key enabler to the Kurds’ 
establishment of autonomy and its subsequent growth.   
The Turks see the potential of U.S. policy and support 
of the Kurds in Iraq potentially leading to “the creation 
of a separate Kurdish state in Northern Iraq.”3  Such an 
event could further fuel autonomous desires among Turkey’s 
                     
2 As the case of Kosovo demonstrates, it is highly important to have 
U.S. support before declaring independence.  Ultimately, it will boil 
down to the approval of the five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council to be successfully recognized. 
3 F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an 
Age of Uncertainty, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003, xii. 
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own indigenous Kurds, which could “threaten the country’s 
territorial integrity.”4  Hence, the United States needs to 
contemplate policy choices that are consistent with their 
overall foreign policy objectives for the region.  Any 
decision to recognize or not recognize any independence 
action by the Kurds must be carefully weighed against 
overall U.S. strategic concerns. 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The literature focusing upon democracy in the Middle 
East has burgeoned since 2003.  This literature, however, 
has not necessarily led to any solid definition of 
democracy in the Middle East.  Reflecting upon this 
confusion, one author notes: “Iraq suffers from a lack of 
clarity and agreement over how to define and assess the 
idea of democracy itself.”5   
Several books written since the 2003 U.S. invasion 
deal specifically with the future of the Kurds in Iraq and 
the challenges they face.  The Goat and the Butcher: 
Nationalism and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq since the 
Iraqi War, by Robert Olsen discusses how the developments 
and evolution of Kurdish nationalism and state formation in 
Kurdistan-Iraq have been “influenced by relations between 
Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, and Turkey.”6  The Kurdish Question 
                     
4 Bill Park, Turkey’s Policy Towards Northern Iraq: Problems and 
Perspectives, New York: Routledge, 2005, 12. 
5 Eric Davis, “The Uses of Historical Memory,” Journal of Democracy 
16.3 (2005), 54. 
6 Robert Olson, The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State 
Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq Since the Iraqi War, Costa Mesa, 
California: Mazda Publishers, 2005, 22. 
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and the 2003 Iraqi War, edited by Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and 
Michael M. Gunter, contains essays written by scholars on 
Kurdish issues, including David McDowall, Michael M. 
Gunter, and Robert Olson.7  Another book, The Future of 
Kurdistan in Iraq, edited by Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, 
and Khahled Salih, is also a compilation of essays by 
various authors.8  Other articles written and studies 
compiled since 2003 focus on the reorganization of Iraq’s 
central government and the creation of a 
democratic/federalized system.  Opinions vary on the 
suitability of Iraq for democracy.  Based upon data 
collected and analyzed for transitioning to democracy from 
an authoritarian regime, “Iraq has a reasonably good set of 
‘building blocks’ to make the transition successfully.”9  
While democratic reforms are the preferred choice, what 
Iraq needs, above all, is “a stable and decent 
government.”10  What form that government eventually takes 
is irrelevant as long as it provides and maintains peace 
and security. 
                     
7 Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael M. Gunter, eds., The Kurdish 
Question and the 2003 Iraqi War, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 
2005.  The essays predominantly focus on the Kurds in Iraq, but several 
of the essays discuss the impact of the 2003 war with respect to 
Kurdish issues in neighboring countries. 
8 Brendan O’Leary, John McGarry, and Kahled Salih, The Future of 
Kurdistan in Iraq, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2005.  The essays in this book are an eclectic collection, focusing on 
a wide range of issues.  These issues include: federalization of Iraq, 
historical legacies imprinted on the Kurds  
9 Robert J. Barro, “Detriments of Democracy,” Journal of Political 
Economy 107.6.2 (December 1999) quoted in Daniel Byman, “Constructing a 
Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Security 
28.1 (2003), 70. 
10 Daniel Byman, “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” International Security 28.1 (2003), 48. 
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An article summarizing the situation of the Kurds is 
“The Fate of the Kurds,” by Graham E. Fuller.11  Although 
written in 1993, the main points still ring true today.  
Fuller’s article focuses on the internal problems of the 
Kurds and the external influences that affect them.  A key 
point made by Fuller is that under the current 
international system, “it is far more preferable that the 
Kurds be able to achieve their ethnic and cultural 
aspirations without… tak[ing] apart three nations.”12  
Fuller argues that change is inevitable for the borders of 
these countries “if the states involved [Iran, Iraq, and 
Turkey] are unable to make the necessary political and 
cultural changes.”13  He also makes the observation that if 
the governments do not allow a little more flexibility with 




Kenneth Waltz developed a theory to help to analyze 
the causes of war in his book Man, the State, and War.14  
Waltz’s theory analyzes the causes of war, managed under 
three headings: “within the man, within the structure of 
the separate states, [and] within the state system.”15  His 
book laid the groundwork for further studies. 
                     
11 Graham E. Fuller, “The Fate of the Kurds,” Foreign Affairs 72 
(Spring 1993). 
12 Fuller, 120. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. 
15 Waltz, 12. 
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The first scholar to utilize Waltz’s levels was David 
Singer.  In a 1961, he published and article entitled “The 
Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations.”16  
Simply referred to now as “levels of analysis,” other 
theorists, both within the International Relations 
community and other communities, have adapted and applied 
these levels to other topics.17  
This thesis will apply the same basic levels of 
analysis as Waltz in Man, the State, and War, using the 
individual, the state, and the international system as the 
foundation for the basis behind lack of state formation for 
the Kurds.  State formation can be explained in much the 
same manner as the causes of war.  For a nationalist 
movement to begin, a strong individual or group of 
individuals must ignite the spark.  That spark spreads and 
the desire for a state naturally follows.  Once that 
movement is internationally recognized and sovereignty is 
established, a new state is born.  This explanation is 
basic, but the main idea is that the formation of a state 
derives from the desires of individuals, an organization at 
a state level, and recognition at the international level.   
The goal with the application of this methodology is 
two-fold.  The first is to provide an insight as to why a 
                     
16 J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International 
Relations,” World Politics 14.1 (October 1961), 77-92. 
17 Examples of application of the levels of analysis include: 
Gleditsch, Nils Peter and Havard Hegre, “Peace and Democracy: Three 
Levels of Analysis,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 41.2 (April 
1997), 283-310;  Bruce J. Avolio and Bernard M. Bass, “Individual 
Consideration Viewed at Multiple Levels of Analysis: A Multi-Level 
Framework for Examining the Diffusion of Transformational Leadership,” 
Leadership Quarterly 6.2 (1995) 199-218; and James Lee Ray, 
“Integrating Levels of Analysis in World Politics,” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 13.4 (2001), 355-388. 
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Kurdish state does not exist.  The second is to examine 
whether prospects for a sovereign state of Kurdistan have 
increased to the point where a declaration of independence 
by the Iraqi Kurds is feasible.   
 
D. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SOURCES 
 
Primary sources used for this thesis are reports from 
U.S. government publications and websites, Iraqi 
governmental reports, and Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
reports, as well as various websites built by Kurdish 
political groups.  Among the primary sources is an email 
interview conducted with the Head of the Department of 
Foreign Relations for the Kurdistan Regional Government, 
Minister Fallah Mustafa Bakir.  Secondary sources come from 
books and articles pertaining to Kurdish aspirations for 
political autonomy and independence.   
  The majority of the scholarly writings on this 
particular issue were completed in or earlier than 2005.  
Additional sources used in this thesis include blogs posted 
on various websites.  Because these blogs reflect dynamic 
current events, traditional peer-reviewed and scholarly 
analysis is not yet available.  While these sources are not 
scholarly works, they provide an important insight into 
newly occurring or resurrected aspects of a distinctly 
Kurdish culture.  The minor use of such sources is 
necessary to show current trends in nationalist movements. 
 
  8
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II. THE STATE, NATIONALISM, AND THE KURDS  
A. DEFINITIONS 
 
Before discussing the Kurds’ lack of statehood using 
the three levels of analysis, it is necessary to define and 
qualify some of the terms used in this paper: state, 
nation, and ethnicity.  These terms are difficult to define 
as many scholars have their own interpretations.     
Ernest Gellner defines state as the agency or group of 
agencies that controls a nation.18  Another widely accepted 
definition comes from Max Weber: “a state is a human 
community that [successfully] claims the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”19  This definition implies that for a geographic 
region to become a state, that one community or group must 
control the legitimate use of force, be it the military 
and/or police within the confines of the area of the state.  
Essentially, the state is an internationally recognized 
political entity encompassing and controlling a territorial 
boundary or nation of people.   
A nation is a group of people that must fulfill three 
requirements: a common culture, a consciousness of shared 
identity, and political organization toward national 
                     
18 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1983, 3. 
19 John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds. Essential Readings: The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations 2nd ed, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 34. 
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goals.20  An ethnicity is "a group with a common cultural 
tradition and sense of identity which exists as a subgroup 
of a larger society."21  The key differentiation between a 
nation and an ethnicity is the idea of higher political 
objectives.  For this thesis, “nation” refers to the 
political aspirations of people bound together by ethnicity 
or other common cultural identity.  A nation need not have 
territory, just the desire that it might one day attain 
sovereignty over its own territory.  
 
B. DEFINING THE KURDS 
 
Sources vary on dates of origin of the Kurds, but most 
sources agree that as long as 3,500 to 4,000 years ago, 
“groups that have been identified as Kurds or the ancestors 
of the Kurds…” appear in the writings of the Sumerians.22  
But who are the Kurds and how do they differ from other 
neighboring peoples? 
Examples of traits that define ethnic groups include 
some or all of the following: language, religion, and the 
common idea of a homeland.  The Kurds are considered their 
own distinct ethnic group, since these traits, to one 
degree or another, applies to them. 
The Kurdish language is a trait that sets them apart 
from their neighbors, and is “probably the most common bond 
                     
20 Jack David Eller, From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: An 
Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999, 144. 
21 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994, 101. 
22 Eller, 153. 
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shared among Kurds.”23  Their language belongs to the Indo-
Iranian family group.  It is similar to the Iranian 
language of Farsi (Persian), yet it has its own distinct 
characteristics.  The only problem with defining the Kurds 
as an ethnicity by their language alone is that there are 
several major dialects within the Kurdish language that are 
not universally understood among the Kurds. 
One might think that religion is a trait that helps to 
define the Kurds as an ethnicity.  This is not the case.  
Most Kurds are Muslim, as are all of the other ethnicities 
that border the region of Kurdistan.24  Like their 
neighbors, the Kurds branch off into the Sunni and Shiite 
sects of Islam.  The Kurds of Iran are predominantly Shiite 
while the Kurds of Iraq and Turkey are mostly Sunni.25  In 
addition, about 5 percent of the Kurds are Yazidis, which 
is a “mixture of Islamic, Christian, Jewish, and pagan 
beliefs.”26  
While the Kurds have populated the Kurdish region for 
many centuries, taking an accurate census of the Kurds is 
difficult.  Figure 1 below illustrates the region dominated 
by the Kurdish ethnicity.  Kurdish sources tend to have 
higher numbers while the numbers in the countries in which 
Kurdistan is located tend to have lower numbers.  This 
                     
23 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 4. 
24 Kurdistan is a geographical term referring to the lands where the 
Kurdish ethnicity is the majority, which consist of the eastern portion 
of Turkey, the western portion of Iran, the northern portion of Iraq, 
and a small segment of northeastern Syria. 
25 Eller, 147. 
26 Eller, 149. 
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disparity can be explained by looking at the population 
from a political viewpoint. 
 
Figure 1.   Predominantly Kurdish Inhabited Areas 200227 
 
The various Kurdish groups who desire statehood or 
greater autonomy want the population to appear larger for 
obvious political reasons.  The states that have Kurdish 
minorities want those numbers as small as possible in order 
to “underplay the size of the Kurdish population.”28  States 
can enact fewer policies and allocate fewer resources to 
appease the smallest ethnic minorities within their 
borders. 
A summary detailing the population of Kurdistan in the 
Middle East and those Kurds in diaspora is found in Table 
                     
27 Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/turkey_ne_2002.jpg, 
website accessed on 9/8/2007. 
28 Gerald Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan, London: Zed Press, 1980, 14. 
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1.  Many of the population sources found in Table 1 are 
Kurdish sources so the numbers may be slightly inflated, 
but overall, these numbers generally agree with those from 
other sources.   
 
Country Estimated number Source  Country Estimated number Source 
Turkey 14,941,800 CIA factbook 
 France 100,000 - 120,000 Kurdish Institute 
Iran 6,250,000 CIA factbook 
 Netherlands 70,000 - 80,000 Kurdish Institute 
Iraq 3,994,200 – 5,325,600 
CIA 
factbook 
 Switzerland 60,000 - 70,000 Kurdish Institute 
Syria 1,619,000 – 1,904,600 
CIA 
factbook 
 Belgium 50,000 - 60,000 Kurdish Institute 
Kuwait 233,500 [1]  Austria 50,000 - 60,000 Kurdish Institute 
Azerbaija
n 200,000 khrp.org 
 Sweden 25,000 - 30,000 Kurdish Institute 
Lebanon 80,000 Kurdish Institute 
 United 
Kingdom 20,000 - 25,000 
Kurdish 
Institute 
Armenia 75,000 khrp.org  Greece 20,000 - 25,000 Kurdish Institute 
Georgia 40,000 khrp.org  Denmark 8,000 - 10,000 Kurdish Institute 
Sub Total 
Asia 
26,076,500 - 27,690,500  Norway 4,000 - 5,000 Kurdish Institute 
United 
States 15,000 - 20,000 
Kurdish 
Institute 
 Italy 3,000 - 4,000 Kurdish Institute 
Canada 6,000 - 7,000 Kurdish Institute 
 Finland 2,000 - 3,000 Kurdish Institute 
Germany 500,000 - 600,000 
Kurdish 
Institute 
 Sub Total 
Europe A 912,000 - 1,092,000 
Note A: Excluding Turkey  GRAND TOTAL 27,006,500 - 28,809,200 
Table 1.   Kurdish Demographics 200229 
 
                     
29 Demographics of the Kurdish Peoples, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/demographics-of-the-kurdish-people, website 
accessed on 3/17/2007. 
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The Kurds have been able to keep their language and 
blood lines relatively intact over the centuries.30  Their 
geographical location put them at the crossroads of many 
empires in the Middle East.  What sets the Kurds apart from 
many of the other people conquered by these empires is that 
the Kurds were never actually conquered; they were simply 
included within the boundaries of these empires.31  For that 
reason, areas inhabited by the Kurds remained relatively 
isolated throughout the centuries. 
 
C. APPLYING THE THREE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS TO THE KURDS 
 
Analyzing the Kurds in terms of individual leadership, 
the state/nation level, and the international system 
provides insight into the reasons why they have not 
achieved statehood and likely will not within the current 
international nation-state system. 
The individual level of analysis is the most clear-cut 
of the three to examine the why the state of Kurdistan does 
not exist.  Throughout the twentieth century, the Kurds 
lacked strong, unifying leadership.  This not to say that 
the Kurds did not have leadership; they did.  The 
leadership was simply not a unifying force for all the 
tribes, much less for state formation.  The Kurds lacked an 
effective leader, such as Kemal Ataturk of Turkey in the 
1920s, when such leadership could have forcefully asserted 
Kurdish claims for statehood in the aftermath of the World 
                     
30 N. Kasrian, Kurdistan, Östersund, Sweden: Oriental Art Publishing, 
1990, 13. 
31 Kasrian, 13. 
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War I peace settlement.  Instead, Ataturk torpedoed efforts 
to create a Kurdish homeland.32  The Kurds had no one to 
challenge Ataturk.  Lacking a strong leader, the Kurds 
proved unable to successfully influence the League of 
Nations in its final disposition of former Ottoman 
territories. 
Since 1923, several individual leaders have 
unsuccessfully tried to unify the Kurds.  One such leader 
was Mullah Mustafa Barzani from Iraq.  In the 1940s, he 
made an effort to spread the ideas of his newly formed 
political party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), among 
the Kurds of Iraq and then onto Kurds in Iran.33  A more 
detailed discussion of Mustafa Barzani and other 
individuals is provided in Chapter IV. 
The second level of analysis, the state, provides an 
explanation why no individual could unite all of the 
Kurds.34  This level of analysis looks within the state to 
find plausible reasons for a lack of unity.  Three main 
factors interfere with possible unity among the Kurds: 
language, politics, and the division of Kurdistan between 
the other states of the Middle East. 
As mentioned before, the Kurdish language is not 
consistent throughout Kurdistan.  The inability to 
communicate “cuts further lines of division across a 
                     
32 Ewan W. Anderson, The Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics, 
London: Routledge, 2000, 124. 
33 Eller, 186. 
34 One exception to this is the Kurds of Iraq.  Barzani and Talibani 
have consolidated power in their respective parties (the KDP and the 
PUK), but have split the Kurdish region into two separate subdivisions 
within the KRG.  More on this topic will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
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simplistic idea of a Kurdish nation.”35  Since the 
vernacular is not consistent, it is not surprising that 
there is no standard written form of the Kurdish 
language.36  In fact, the Kurds’ printed media takes 
several forms, which include Arabic, Cyrillic, and Persian.  
Without a common spoken and written language, the Kurdish 
dream of statehood will likely remain just that, a dream.   
While the “parent governments” (Iran, Turkey, and 
Iraq) might not consider it as a good idea, the Kurds could 
use the methods Israel employed to unify through language.  
One of the first steps Israel took to unify its people was 
to teach and use Hebrew rather than have a nation that 
spoke German, Russian, Arabic, etc.  Since the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, efforts like this are taking place in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. 
Language and religion are not the only differences 
within the Kurdish nation.  Politics is even more diverse.  
In Turkey, there are more than 25 recognized Kurdish 
political parties.37  During the December 2005 Iraqi 
elections, seven officially recognized Kurdish parties were 
represented on the ballot.  Six of the seven Kurdish 
parties (KDP, PUK, Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan 
Labour Party, Kurdistan Islamic Group of Iraq, and 
Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party) combined and ran as 
                     
35 David McDowall, “The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review,” in 
The Kurds: Contemporary Overview, London: Routledge Press, 1992, 11. 
36 Eller, 146. 
37 Robert Olson, ed., The Kurdish National Movement in the 1990’s: 
Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Lexington, KY: University 
Press of Kentucky, 1996, 2. 
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part of the Kurdistan Alliance (KA).38  The other party, the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union, ran on its own.  While some of the 
groups have tried to rally others behind their cause, as 
Barzani attempted, these parties seem more inclined to 
fight as hard amongst themselves as they do against the 
states to which they belong.  This political division only 
detracts from the possibility of statehood. 
The distribution of Kurds among the states of the 
Middle East contributes to the disagreements of the 
political organizations.  Turkey, Iran, and Iraq have 
contrasting state systems that deprive the Kurds of the 
opportunity to develop a single political culture or 
structure.39  As treatment of the Kurds varies from state to 
state, the goals of the Kurdish political parties and 
organizations differ accordingly.   
Because Kurdistan lays over the boundaries of several 
states, this issue also falls into the third level of 
analysis, the international system.40  The Kurds are not 
fighting for independence from one state; they are 
struggling to break free of established regional states.  
Solving the Kurdish dilemma is not as simplistic as 
redrawing borders.  Other ethnicities with similar desires 
for self-determination could view it as an opportunity to 
seek independence.  Figure 2 shows the ethno-religious 
                     
38 “Guide to Iraqi political parties,” BBC News, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4511450.stm, website 
accessed on 2/18/2008. 
39 Fuller, 110. 
40 Kurdistan is a geographical term for the land in the areas 
previously mentioned in the Kurds are the dominant ethnicity. 
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breakdown in Iran.41  There is no current data to support 
that either the Iranian Kurds or the Azeris have any large 
nationalistic movements.  This, however, was not true in 
the 1940s, as both ethnicities fought against the Iranians 
for independence.42  Thus, future uprisings among these 
ethnic groups should not be discounted.  A redistribution 
along ethnic lines would not sit well with the Iranians and 
potentially (if not likely) cause ethnic conflict in the 
region.  
                     
41 Note that the entire northwestern third of the country is not 
ethnic Persian. 
42 In the case of the Kurds, they in fact won their independence for 
a brief time when they formed the Mahabad Republic.  The Azeris also 
contemplated their own republic within Iran in the 1940s.  See John 
Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The Tragic 




Figure 2.   Ethnoreligious Distribution of Iran - 200443 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Although the Kurds are a nation with a common culture, 
a shared identity, and have political organizations that 
pursue nationalistic-type goals, they still do not have an 
internationally recognized state.  The history of the 
Kurds, examined in the next two chapters, provides insight 
into the reasons the Kurds have been unable to achieve 
statehood, but have made significant progress toward that 
end.   
                     
43 Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iran_ethnoreligious
_distribution_2004.jpg, website accessed on September 8, 2007. 
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III. THE KURDS AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE 
The period between 1916 and 1923 saw many treaties and 
conferences come and go as the allies sought to work out 
the aftermath of their victory in World War I.  The borders 
that were established during this period, even those which 
were completely arbitrary, remain to this day.44  The 
victorious Western allies did not create these states with 
all the newly emancipated peoples and nations in mind; they 
had their own economic and imperialistic ideas.  
One such nation directly affected by the distribution 
of the Ottoman Empire by the Western Allies was the Kurds.  
The Kurds had as legitimate a case for independence as any 
other ethnic groups of the region.  To this day, the Kurds 
remain the largest ethnicity in the world that have their 
never had their own nation-state.45   
Hopes for an independent Kurdistan were high in 1920, 
but diminished by the middle of 1923.  This chapter will 
perform two functions.  The first is to discuss the border-
creating process during the period from 1916 to 1923.  The 
second will utilize the three levels of analysis as they 
apply to state formation the Treaty of Lausanne.    
                     
44 The countries that were created under the Mandate system, which 
subsequently became independent states, have the same borders that were 
created during the 1920s.  The only two real exceptions to this are the 
creation of Israel in 1948 and the combining of the Yemeni states in 
1990.  See F. Gregory Gause, III, “Sovereignty, Statecraft and 
Stability in the Middle East,” Journal of International Affairs, 45.2 
(Winter 1992), 442. 
45 The one exception to this statement is the short-lived Republic of 
Mahabad in Iran during the late 1940s, discussed in Chapter IV. 
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A. SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT 
 
As World War I progressed, the British, French, and 
Russians already assumed victory was inevitably theirs.  As 
early as 1916, secret agreements were in the works on how 
to divide the remnants of the Ottoman Empire.  The majority 
of the territories of the former empire were to go to 
Britain and France.46 
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was to divide the Ottoman 
territories into British and French mandates.  Figure 3 is 
a map of the agreement, representing the division of the 
spoils after World War I between the two victorious powers.  
The British would take custody of the regions that would 
become Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and parts of Saudi Arabia.  
The French mandate included areas that would become Syria, 
Lebanon, and parts of Turkey.47  Sykes-Picot made no 
provision for the Kurdish areas.  The first mention of a 
possible free Kurdish state came several years later in the 
Treaty of Sevres. 
                     
46 The only mention of Russia, in the agreement, is that the sides 
would compare notes regarding a previous meeting. 
47 Please note the area designated as an “international zone” in the 
agreement.  This is the area that would later become Israel.  It would appear 
that at least a year before the Balfour declaration, there was some intention 
of creating an additional state in that area. 
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Figure 3.   Sykes-Picot Agreement of 191648 
 
 
B. LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES 
 
Before discussing the Treaty of Sevres, the next step 
in the distribution came at the conference of San Remo in 
1920.  Figure 4 shows the actual boundaries as delineated 
during the San Remo conference.  There are two main 
differences between the final resolutions at San Remo 
versus the Sykes-Picot agreement.  The first is the removal 
of the mandate that was to be under French influence in 
                     
48Mike Shuster, “The Middle East and the West: WWI and Beyond,” 
National Public Radio website, 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=3860950, website accessed 
January 9, 2008.  
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what is now Turkey.  The second is the re-designation of 
the international area on the Mediterranean coast and 
incorporating that into the Palestinian Mandate.   
 
 
Figure 4.   League of Nations Mandates, 192049 
 
The United States had originally been interested in 
participating in the Mandate system.  The King Crane 
Commission presented a report that spelled out the 
possibilities for American mandates in the Armenian and 
Kurdish regions.50  President Woodrow Wilson supported an 
Armenian Mandate in what is today eastern Turkey.  He did 
                     
49 Mike Shuster, “The Middle East and the West: WWI and Beyond,” 
National Public Radio website, 
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyID=3860950, website accessed 
1/9/2008. 
50 David McDowell, A Modern History of the Kurds, London: I.B. 
Tauris, 1996, 130. 
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not, however, support a Kurdish Mandate.  In fact, he 
grouped the Kurds and Turks together as peoples and sought 
to “teach them a lesson.”51   
Congress rejected the idea of the United States 
accepting any mandates.  It did not want to shoulder the 
responsibility for three main reasons.   
The first is that “it would unnecessarily involve the 
still isolationist United States in the quagmire of world 
colonial infighting.”52  Just as the United States was 
reluctant to get involved in World War I, it was still 
trying to remain on the fringes of world affairs. 
The second reason is that “both Armenia and Kurdistan 
were remote and hardly accessible by sea.”53  During this 
time-period, the United States was still primarily a sea 
power.  The U.S. had no way to directly supply or protect 
the region should it accept a mandate in the region.  
The third reason was that “it would have been 
unprofitable, since Britain had decided to annex and keep 
central Kurdistan and its petroleum wealth.”54  The region 
surrounding Mosul had already been identified by American 
and British oil companies as having vast reserves of oil.  
Since the British had already claimed that region, it did 
not seem economical to pursue the issue any further. 
 
                     
51 McDowell, (1996), 130. 
52 Mehrdad R. Izady, A Concise Handbook: The Kurds. Washington, D.C: 
Taylor and Francis, Inc., 1992, 60. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Izady, 60. 
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C. TREATY OF SEVRES 
 
The next step in the boundary distribution process 
came in late 1920 with the Treaty of Sevres.  This Treaty 
is among the more important, if not the most important, 
aspect in the nationalist movement for the Kurds.  Article 
64 of the Treaty discusses the creation of Kurdistan. 
If within one year from the coming into force of 
the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the 
areas defined in Article 62 shall address 
themselves to the Council of the League of 
Nations in such a manner as to show that a 
majority of the population of these areas desires 
independence from Turkey, and if the Council then 
considers that these peoples are capable of such 
independence and recommends that it should be 
granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute 
such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights 
and title over these areas.55 
 
Figure 5 shows the boundaries of Kurdistan as discussed in 
Article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres. 
                     
55 The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, Section I, Articles 1- 260, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I%2C_Articles_1_-_260, website 
accessed on Sept. 6, 2007. From The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 
II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924. 
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Figure 5.   Treaty of Sevres - 192056 
 
The other important portion of Article 64 details that 
the vilayet of Mosul is included within the boundaries of 
Kurdistan.57  It is important to discuss this aspect of the 
Treaty of Sevres, as it may have been a contributing factor 
as to why Kurdistan was deleted from the Treaty of Lausanne 
in 1923.  As noted before, this region had great oil 
potential, therefore Britain did not want to give away its 
influence over this region. 
                     
56 The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, Section I, Articles 1- 260, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/images/1/14/TreatyOfSevresMapOfTurkey.gif,, 
website accessed on Sept. 7, 2007. From The Treaties of Peace 1919-
1923, Vol. II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 
1924. 
57 The Treaty of Sèvres, 1920, Section I, Articles 1- 260, 
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I%2C_Articles_1_-_260, website 
accessed on Sept. 6, 2007. From The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. 
II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924. 
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D. TREATY OF LAUSANNE 
 
The development of the Treaty of Lausanne is complex.  
The need for a revision from the borders established in the 
Treaty of Sevres was necessary to the Turks because it “was 
quite methodically aimed at carving up the Turkish 
territories, and was… profoundly unjust and humiliating for 
the Turkish people.”58  The Ottoman government that signed 
the Treaty of Sevres was no longer in power at the signing 
of the Treaty of Lausanne.  The Young Turks took over power 
in Turkey by 1923, and were dissatisfied with the 
boundaries of the 1920 treaty.   
 
Figure 6.   Treaty of Lausanne - 192359 
                     
58 Gerald Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan, London: Zed Press, 1980, 44. 
59 The Treaty of Lausanne, http://www.hri.org/docs/lausanne/turkey.gif, 
website accessed on September 7, 2007. From The Treaties of Peace 1919-
1923, Vol. II, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1924. 
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The misunderstanding between the West and the peoples 
of the Middle East are just part of the explanation as to 
why the state of Kurdistan does not exist.  Other factors 
are also involved.  One way to analyze these factors is to 
apply the three levels of analysis. 
After the fall of the Ottomans, all of the former 
subjects were able to establish their own states, or at 
least have a mandate over them, which would eventually lead 
to independence.60  “The only exception was the Kurdish 
people, largely because of the political incompetence and 
historical backwardness of its leaders.”61  
One reason for the absence of strong leadership may 
have to do with the situation in Kurdistan following the 
war.  During World War I, battles between the Russians and 
Ottomans swept through the northern and western portions of 
Kurdistan.62  Devastation from the war, as well as “looting 
and destruction of crops by Russian, Ottoman, and British 
[troops]… caused severe famine in the area.”63  In such dire 
conditions, it was the central focus of all tribal leaders 
to rebuild their village/tribal infrastructure in order to 
provide for their own people.  Major nationalist or 
political movements were not foremost in their minds; 
survival was the necessity. 
Ironically, this is an example of a “golden 
opportunity” wasted.64  This, of all times in a nation’s 
                     
60 Chaliand, 44. 
61 Chaliand, 44.  The Armenians were able to gain their own state, 
but it was almost immediately absorbed into the Soviet Union. 
62 Izady, 58. 
63 Ibid., 59.  
64 Izady, 58.  
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history, begged for the need for strong, unifying 
leadership.  “Tribal loyalty was greater than the urge for 
Kurdish nationalism.”65  
Tribalism may be the primary reason that the Kurds 
were unable to become a recognized state.  Good leadership 
may have been present, but fear that one clan or tribe 
would become too powerful in relation to the other tribes 
prevented unification of all the tribes.  They historically 
fought amongst themselves to maintain some semblance of 
balance with respect to tribal power.  
There were three main political agendas among the 
Kurds: “pro-Turkish, pro-Allies, and… a desire for complete 
independence from all outside interference.”66  The problem, 
as McDowell points out in A Modern History of the Kurds, is 
that “these [political] strands were not distinct” and 
“many Kurds, perplexed by the uncertainties involved, did 
not wish to commit themselves irretrievably to one course 
or action.”67  Faced with a seemingly untenable situation, 
most Kurds decided to do nothing. 
Additionally, even before Kurdistan was split into the 
different states that exist today (Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and 
Syria), the Kurds were divided between different empires.  
The Ottomans governed the western portion of Kurdistan and 
the Persians governed the eastern part.  This division also 
precluded any unity among the Kurds as a whole nation.   
                     
65 Edgar O’Balance, The Kurdish Struggle: 1920-1994, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996, 13. 
66 McDowell (1996), 125. 
67 Ibid. 
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The first of these explanations finds its roots in the 
economics of the region.  As noted before, oil was one of 
the major reasons that the vilayet of Mosul was ceded to 
the British as part of the Iraq mandate.  The only 
remaining Kurdish region left for its own state now was the 
region in eastern Turkey.   
As explained previously, Ataturk was the strongest 
regional leader during this treaty process.  He used his 
military influence to gain more territory for Turkey.  In 
order to solidify Turkish control of the Kurdish and 
Armenian region of Anatolia, he used the threat of a 
Christian invasion to rally a large Kurdish force to fight 
along side the Turks.68  The Christian threat came from the 
Greeks, who had landed at Smyrna, and the Armenians from 
the north.69  The use of Islam as a rallying point was 
ingenious for Ataturk, who favored and implemented a 
secular government in Turkey. 
Another possible international influence that caused a 
drastic change between the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne, 
was Russia’s influence in the region.  The Western Allies 
saw a larger and stronger Turkish state as “a possible 
south-eastern bastion” against the communists.70  If this 
were true, the reasoning for the omission of Kurdistan had 
little to do with the Kurds, but rather the importance of 
establishing a buffer between the East (Russia in this 
case) and the West.  
 
                     
68 O’Balance, 14. 
69 McDowell (1996), 126 and 134. 
70 O’Balance, 14. 
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E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The treaty process after World War I saw the creation 
of new states with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.  One 
group excluded was the Kurds.  Using the three levels of 
analysis, it clear to understand why the Kurds were left 
out. 
First, there was no strong, central leadership for the 
Kurds.  Second, there was no substantial nationalist 
movement during that time-period due to the tribal 
rivalries and the need to meet the basic survival needs of 
the people.  Lastly, there were international influences 
that were beyond their control that contributed to the 
omission of a Kurdish state. 
The relevance of discussing the treaty process in the 
early 1920s deals with the historical memory of the Kurds.  
They were promised their own state in the Treaty of Sevres, 
but that promise was disregarded.  The desire for 
sovereignty and the exclusion within the Treaty of Lausanne 
provided the catalyst for nationalist movements that 
occurred in the following decades. 
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IV. KURDISH NATIONALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS: 
1920S TO PRESENT 
The previous chapter summarized the plight of the 
Kurds after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the in 
World War I and the treaty process that followed.  This 
chapter will examine some of the more prominent uprisings 
and the role of key figures in Kurdish politics since 1923.   
The autonomy that the Iraqi Kurds presently have is a 
culmination of developments over the last ninety years.  
Breaking down the progress at each level of analysis is 
difficult because some of the events are combinations of 
one or more of each of these levels.  This chapter will 
break down the developments by each decade rather than each 
level of analysis in order to provide a more logical flow.  
Each level of analysis can be seen during each decade 
through the leadership of the more renowned Kurds, the 
formation and development of political parties at the 
‘state’ level, and how international influence continued to 




The British administered the Iraqi Mandate through the 
local traditional leaders during the 1920s as it did in its 
other colonies around the world.71  The leader they chose to 
administer the Kurdish area of the Iraqi mandate was a 
prominent Kurd, Mahmoud Barzanji, considered both an agha 
                     
71 Edgar O’Balance, The Kurdish Struggle: 1920-1994, New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, Inc., 1996, 19. 
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and sheik.72  He served as governor of the region under 
Ottoman rule, yet the area that the British gave him was 
much larger than it had been under the Ottomans.  Because 
of the tribal nature of Kurdish society, his appointment 
“brought him into conflict with other Kurdish aghas and 
sheiks.”73  Soon after his appointment, he began to question 
the British authority and was sent to exile in India. 
The British soon realized the necessity of Mahmoud 
Barzanji to help “stabilise” the region due to the 
encroachment of Ataturk and Turkish troops in British areas 
of the Kurdish region.74  Upon his return from exile, 
Barzanji’s method of stabilization was not what the British 
had intended.  He immediately began negotiations with the 
Turkish authorities and “turned against the British in 
rebellion.”75  After the Royal Air Force (RAF) drove 
Barzanji out of the region, “an uneasy peace settled on the 





Based upon the agreement in the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 
1930, which was implemented in 1932, Britain gave Iraq its 
independence.77  In the treaty, “Iraq had promised to 
respect the language and customs of the Kurds,” but 
                     
72 Aghas are spiritual leaders.  Sheiks are tribal leaders. 
73 O’Balance, 19. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 20. 
76 Ibid., 20. 
77 O’Balance, 20. 
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promised “little else.”78  Mahmoud Barzanji called for a 
revolt in support of a “United Kurdistan,” but was soon 
defeated.79  In a futile attempt to gain international 
support, the Kurdish “rebels sought to remind the League of 
Nations of its promises concerning an autonomous Kurdish 
administration.”80  
The response was not what the Kurds had desired or 
anticipated.  The “relevant Council committee [within the 
League of Nations] declared that the discussion of the 
question of the autonomy of certain minorities in Iraq did 
not fall within its ambit.”81  Essentially, the League of 
Nations chose to ignore a plea from one of the minorities 
specifically mentioned in its own mandate system.  While 
their plea with the League of Nations was unsuccessful, 
“this was… the first real evidence of popular Kurdish 
separatist aspirations in Iraq.”82 
The “next Kurdish separatist leader of some note was 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani,” the grandson of Mahmoud Barzanji.83  
Mustafa Barzani carried on his grandfather’s “clashes with 
central authority, but was also forced to surrender.84   
The 1937 Saadabad Treaty was intended to stifle any 
Kurdish nationalist movements.85  Turkey, Persia, and Iraq 
                     
78 O’Balance, 20. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Gerald Chaliand, ed., People Without a Country: The Kurds and 
Kurdistan, London: Zed Press, 1980, 163. 
81 Ibid. 
82 O’Balance, 20. 
83 Ibid. 
84 O’Balance, 20. 
85 Chaliand, 163. 
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signed the treaty targeting Kurdish movements, although the 
Kurds are not specifically mentioned within the text.  It 
“was aimed against the formation and activity of 
associations, organizations, or armed bands seeking to 
overthrow established institutions,” but it did little to 
stop Kurdish movements.86 
The first, well-organized Iraqi Kurdish political 
parties was created late in the 1930s.  The Hewa Party 
(originally called the Hope Party) was founded between 1939 
and 1942, depending upon the source.87  The Hewa’s 
“objective was to promote the freedom of Kurdish people and 
the liberation of Kurdistan,” and its constituents hailed 
mostly from the “Iraqi Kurdish intelligentsia.” 88  Hewa was 
unable to gain large popular support “because the average 
[Kurdish] peasant simply could not relate Hiwa nationalist 
rhetoric to his/her own highly circumscribed world.”89  The 
party eventually merged with the KDP in 1952 to form the 
United Kurdistan Democratic Party (UKDP).90 
 
                     
86 Chaliand, 163. 
87 Edmund Ghareeb, The Historical Dictionary of Iraq, Lanham, Md.: 
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 93; O’Balance, 26; and McDowall, 289.  Hewa is 
also spelled Hiwa and Heva depending upon the source. 
88 Ghareeb, 93 and O’Balance, 23. 
89 McDowall (1996), 290. Hewa is spelled different ways depending 
upon the text. 




In 1944, “the first formalization of cross-border 
Kurdish nationalism” came in the form of “the Peman I Se 
Senur, or the Pact of the Three Borders.”91  Kurdish 
representatives from Iran, Iraq, and Turkey met “to pledge 
mutual support and sharing of resources.”92  While this 
agreement “gave heart to the Kurds,” it “was no more than a 
symbolic gesture.”93  The Pact never led to a unified front 
for Kurdish nationalist movements between the three 
countries, but it did provide a preview of events soon to 
follow in Iran that demonstrated that Kurdish nationalist 
ideals were not unique or isolated to any single country. 
In the summer of 1945, Mustafa Barzani founded the 
Freedom Party, which was renamed the Kurdish Democratic 
Party (KDP).94  The goal of the KDP was “to bring about 
cooperation between the tribes in the Barzan region then 
between all Kurdish tribes.”95  The KDP’s nationalist 
propaganda was easy to understand by the Kurdish peasantry.  
Thus, it gained more support from the lower classes than 




                     
91 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends But the Mountains: The 
Tragic History of the Kurds, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 
100-101. 
92 McDowall (1996), 237. 
93 Ibid, 101. 
94 O’Balance, 26. 
95 Ibid. 
  38
needed to, and did work together because of the different 
party bases, it also led to friction between the two 
parties.96 
In August of 1945, a spontaneous revolt erupted in 
Iraq between the Iraqi police and members of the Barzani 
clan.97  By October, Mustafa Barzani and his followers were 
forced to flee across the border into Iran.   
The events in Iran and the establishment of the 
Mahabad Republic in 1946 are beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  It is, however, important to note that it was the 
Iraqi Kurds, led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who played a 
large role in the formation of the republic.  The 
reputation earned by Barzani during this period is 
significant as it helped solidify his role as a military 




In 1952, Hewa Party and the KDP combined to form the 
United Kurdistan Democratic Party (UKDP).99  Even though he 
was still in the Soviet Union, Mustafa Barzani was 
nominated as the chairman of the new party in absentia.100 
                     
96 Ibid. 
97 O’Balance, 27. 
98 After being forced to leave Iran, Mustafa Barzani was able to 
evade arrest and managed to escape to the USSR, where he remained for 
the next eleven years.  See Chaliand, 163, Bulloch, and Morris, 116.  
99 O’Balance, 36 and McDowall (1996), 300. 
100 O’Balance, 36. 
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Immediately after the successful coup d’etat in 1958, 
Karim Qasim (the new leader of Iraq) pardoned many of the 
Kurds imprisoned during the revolts against the Iraqi 
monarchy.101  Qasim needed the cooperation of the Kurds to 
unify Iraq and since the Kurds did not initially want to 
cooperate Qasim, he sought the assistance of Mustafa 
Barzani.  He allowed Barzani to return to Iraq if he took 
charge of the Kurds and helped Qasim consolidate power.102 
The plan was advantageous to both as it did help control 
the Kurds to some extent and allowed Mustafa Barzani to 
strengthen his role as the leader of the Iraqi Kurds.  
As the 1950s closed, Qasim had consolidated power with 
the help of the Kurds.  It should come as no surprise that 
Barzani and the Kurds would become Qasim’s “next target.”103 
The Kurds and Barzani’s KDP were the only “organized, 





In 1960, Barzani insisted that the UKDP revert to the 
original KDP to further his leadership of the Kurds.105  He 
was re-elected to the position of party chairman at the 
Fifth Congress of the KDP in 1961.  As his strength grew 
within the Kurdish region, ties with Qasim became strained.  
                     
101 O’Balance, 37. 
102 McDowall (1996), 303. 
103 Bulloch and Morris, 122. 
104 Ibid. 
105 O’Balance, 40. 
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Even though the animosity between the two was growing, 
neither Barzani nor Qasim openly “sought direct conflict” 
between Kurdish and Iraqi forces, however it was 
unavoidable 106 
In the summer of 1961, Qasim launched the “First 
Offensive” by “moving troops into Kurdish areas and bribing 
anti-Barzani tribes to fight on the government’s side, 
which caused disagreement among the members of the KDP.  
One faction wanted to “delay action as long as possible to 
enable the KDP to build up strength.”107  Another faction, 
led by Jalal Talibani, an emerging figure in the KDP, 
favored immediate action as he felt that “Qasim had lost 
the confidence of his army” and that the KDP could quickly 
meet the Kurdish objectives.108 
In February 1963, Qasim’s Free Officers turned on him 
and mounted another coup d’etat that brought the Ba’ath 
party to power.  Jalal Talibani, was sent as the Kurdish 
negotiator with the new government.  The Ba’ath regime felt 
that the “question of Kurdish autonomy was a side issue” 
and that “the question of Arab unity” was the most 
important issue to attend.109  Overall, the negotiations 
were a failure and the remainder of the 1960s continued 
with a series of five more offenses staged by the Iraqi 
government against the Kurds.   
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After almost a decade of fighting, two factors led to 
a 1970 Peace Accord.  The first was the inability of the 
Iraqi armed forces to decisively defeat Mustafa Barzani and 
his Peshmerga.  The other was that the Iraqi government had 
also begun to worry about Iranian intervention on behalf of 
the Kurds, since Iran had been supplying the Kurds with 
arms for the better part of the decade, and they were 
unable to secure the Iran-Iraq border.110   
The most important aspect of the accord was the 
“recognized… existence of the Kurdish nation” within 
Iraq.111  This remained “the best deal the Kurds of Iraq had 
been offered” and “remained the Kurd’s favorite foundation 
stone for future relations with the rest of Iraq” until the 
late 1990s.112 
The peace did not last long.  Skirmishes between 
Kurdish peshmerga and Iraqi troops were constant throughout 
the early 1970s, culminating with the 1974-75 war. 
The Iraqi government forged a friendship treaty with 
the USSR in 1972 “as a counterbalance to the close Iran-USA 
relationship that was developing.”113  It should not be 
surprising that as Iraq shifted its focus toward the Soviet 
Union, the Kurds shifted theirs to the West.  In 1971, and 
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again in 1972, Mustafa Barzani “appealed to the United 
States for aid.”114  The United States was wary of becoming 
involved.  It was not until after Iraq signed the “Iraqi-
Soviet Treaty of Friendship” that the U.S. decided to 
provide aid.115  The aid was not direct and came through 
U.S. allies in the region, including Iran and Israel.  The 
United States even went as far as sending CIA operatives 
into Iraq “to advise the Kurds, so that as hostilities once 
again built up, Barzani’s peshmerga were in a better 
condition than ever before to present a real challenge to 
the Iraqi forces.”116 
Iran supported the Kurds because it had hoped the war 
might lead to an overthrow of the Ba’ath.117  Iran had to be 
careful with its support of the Kurds because the “Shah had 
his own Kurdish minority” and “had vivid memories of the 
trouble caused by the Mahabad Republic.”118  Even with that 
memory, the Shah found himself doing what he knew might 
cause rebellion in his own country, overtly backing the 
Kurdish forces.119  
Before events escalated between Iran and Iraq, the 
Shah and Iraq’s vice president, Saddam Hussein, were able 
to reach an agreement regarding issues unrelated to the 
Kurds.  The agreement, however, involved a complete 
withdrawal of Iranian support for the Iraqi Kurds.  The 
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supplies stopped “within hours of the agreement,” leaving 
the Kurds “shattered by the sudden turn of events.”120   
Within a month, the Kurds “decided to abandon the 
fight” and more than 100,000 Kurds fled northern Iraq.121  
Mustafa Barzani was among those who fled to Iran and 
eventually moved to the United States, where he died in 
1979.122  After Mustafa Barzani’s death, his son Masoud 
returned to Iraqi Kurdistan, was accepted “by most of the 
factions of the KDP-PL,” and was elected as the provisional 
leader.123 
The 1975 defeat also had political ramifications 
within Iraqi Kurdistan.  With the “influence of the 
[Mustafa] Barzani from the region,… the field was left open 
for left-wing groupings.”124  In June of 1975, Jalal 
Talibani completely broke from the KDP to form one such 
left-wing party; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).  
Uprisings against the Iraqi government did not stop 
after the defeat in 1975.  While not as organized as the 
Mustafa Barzani-led revolts, the Kurds pestered Iraqi 
forces using guerilla warfare tactics through 1980.  
Additionally, in-fighting among the Kurds began centering 
on the disagreements between the two dominant political 
parties — the KDP and the PUK. 
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September 1980 marked the beginning of the Iran-Iraq 
War.  The Kurds in both Iran and Iraq “sought to exploit” 
the Iran-Iraq War to their own advantage.”125  While they 
were successful to some extent, the governments in Tehran 
and Baghdad were the ones to take advantage of the Kurds.  
To complicate matters, Kurds from both countries “were 
conscripted into the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces.”126   
When Iran began its counter-offensive in 1982, most of 
the leaders of the different Kurdish factions were 
approached by Saddam Hussein for help holding off Iran.  
Hussein’s objective was two-fold: one, he wanted to seal 
off the Iran-Iraq border in the Kurdish provinces in order 
to protect the oil fields at Kirkuk, and two, he wanted to 
create internal dissent among the Kurdish factions.127  He 
was successful with both objectives. 
Jalal Talibani was the only Kurdish leader to 
entertain the idea of a cease-fire with Baghdad.  His 
reasons for agreeing were to gain some “breathing space to 
reorganize,” gain access to Iraqi weapons and supplies, and 
“the possibility of handing to the Kurdish people an 
acceptable improvement on… [Kurdish] autonomy.”128  If he 
were successful, he “might replace Barzani as the real 
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champion of Kurdish nationalism.”129  Baghdad did not uphold 
its agreement with Talibani and the cease-fire with the PUK 
ended in January 1985. 
In May 1987, the major Kurdish factions, including the 
KDP and PUK, joined peshmerga forces to form the Kurdistan 
National Front (KNF).130  Backed by Iran, the KNF became a 
“growing menace for Baghdad.”131  This set the stage for one 
of the most important and horrifying events in Kurdish 
history. 
To remove the threat of the Kurds, who were assisting 
Iran, Iraq began the Anfal campaigns in the summer of 1987.  
Iraq set out on a course to destroy the Kurds of Iraq.  
According to Gareth Stansfield, “the Anfal campaigns… were  
characterized by the comprehensive destruction of the rural 
environment and infrastructure, deportation of the Kurdish 
population, and the use of chemical weapons against the 
civilian population.”132  The use of chemical weapons, 
particularly at Halabja on 17 March 1988, brought the 
plight of the Kurds to the world’s attention. 
The Anfal campaigns did not have the desired effect on 
the Kurds.  Since there was “little left for Kurdish 
leaders to lose, [they] resolved to continue the struggle 
come what may.”133  The central purpose behind continuing 
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the resistance “was that such operations would tie up large 
numbers of government troops and have an attritional 
effect.”134  
Another side effect of “the horrific treatment of 
Kurdish civilians by the Iraqi war machine… brought the 
Iraqi Kurdish political parties to realize the need for a 
comprehensive alliance… if there was any chance of 
meaningful survival.”135  While the cooperation was slow to 
develop, the end of the 1980s found a new level of Kurdish 




The 1990s opened with the invasion of Kuwait in August 
1990.  During the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent 
Gulf War, the Kurds “remained nominally passive.”136  Though 
the memory of the Anfal campaigns was still fresh in the 
mind of the Kurds, “both the KDP and the PUK sought to 
dispel speculation that they were willing to participate in 
a… campaign to overthrow Saddam.”137 
As the Gulf War came to an end, spontaneous Kurdish 
uprisings occurred in the north.  One aspect of this 
Kurdish revolt that differed from previous uprisings was 
that this “uprising came from the people themselves.”138  
Even Masoud Barzani was surprised and stated, “We didn’t 
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expect it.”139  The leaders of the Kurdistan Front “merely 
followed the people into the streets.”140    
The Kurds had expected the U.S.-led coalition forces 
to help them; they were wrong.  The United States’ goal for 
the liberation of Kuwait did not include a regime change in 
Iraq or overt assistance for the Shia or the Kurds.  The 
fear was that “the breakup of Iraq and the unleashing of 
both internal [the Shia and the Kurds] and external [Iran 
and Turkey] forces that might try to seize parts of the 
country.”141  The U.S. wanted to keep Iraq in tact to 
maintain stability in the region.  A complete defeat of 
Iraq would create a power vacuum, thus increasing 
instability in the Middle East.   
While the United States did not directly interfere on 
behalf of the Kurds, they did enforce the “no-fly zone” 
over northern Iraq in accordance with United Nations 
Resolution 688.142  Saddam tested the resolve of the “no-fly 
zone” in April 1992, but backed down after strong warnings 
from the U.S., France, and Britain.143   
On 19 May 1992, the Kurds held an election for an 
assembly to administer the Kurdish Autonomous Region 
(KAR).144  The election results demonstrated the popularity 
of Masoud Barzani (KDP) and Jalal Talibani (PUK), each 
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receiving almost one-half of all the votes.145  The KAR had 
been in effect since 1974, but only on paper.  This was the 
first set of elections for a Kurdistan National Assembly 
(KNA), creating “an historic moment” for the Kurds.146  This 
“peaceful, multiparty election… was a symbolic threat to 
not only Saddam but to all un-elected regimes in the 
region.”147  During its first assembly in June 1992, the KNA 
changed its name to the present Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG). 
The problem with this new political achievement was 
that “the KNA was desperately striving to turn a multi-
group guerrilla movement into an autonomous 
administration.”148  The division within the new government 
was fifty-fifty, which made a majority vote almost 
impossible.   
In 1994, the new regional government faced a dilemma 
when the KDP and PUK relationship “deteriorated into 
serious armed conflict.”149  Even though both parties had 
effectively controlled their own regions prior to 1994, the 
conflict between the two solidified the divide. (See Figure 
7 below.) 
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Figure 7.   KDP and PUK Controlled Area of KRG from 1991 to 
2001150 
 
Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talibani decided that the 
conflict needed to end and embarked upon an “indigenous 
peace process in… 1997.”151  There are two important aspects 
to note about the peace process between the two parties: 
one, the decision to sit down and discuss peace was not 
forced by an outside actor, and two, it “proved that the 
KDP and PUK could sit at the same table and discuss 
technical issues separately from political issues.”152  The 
Washington Agreement of 1998 established the grounds for 
political unity among the Kurds of Iraq. 
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The net result of the Washington Agreement was 
“preservation of geographical areas of influence and 
security.”153  Iraqi Kurdistan was divided in two along the 
existing lines of areas already controlled by each party.  
Each sub-region would govern its own domestic affairs with 




The Kurdish Provinces under the control of the KRG 
have enjoyed a greater degree of political autonomy since 
1998.  The period between 1998 and 2003 brought more 
compromise and restructuring within the KRG.  New cabinets 
were formed and there were some “power distributions within 
the parties”154  The situation did not change drastically 
from the 1998 agreement and there was still rivalry between 
Barzani and Talibani.   
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 had an effect that 
could be considered surprising: the Kurds did not use this 
occasion to revolt or strive for independence.  There are 
two plausible contributors to this decision.  One is that 
Iraq’s neighbors, specifically Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and 
Iran, feared “the possibilities of an independent Kurdistan 
emerging” would threaten their national security and/or 
their regimes.155  The second is that the U.S. made it well 
known that they wanted to use the Iraqi Kurds as an example 
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of a working democracy and as a model for a new Iraq.156  
The Kurdish leadership quickly realized that it was in the 
best interest of all Iraqi Kurds to maintain the status quo 
and to work within the new government rather than against 
it.   
Most Kurdish scholars and politicians acknowledge that 
a separate state will probably not emerge, so they are 
becoming more active in Iraqi politics.  The Kurds are 
well-represented within the new Iraqi government.  Their 
representation within the government is proportional to its 
population in Iraq.  With approximately 20 percent of the 
total population, the number of cabinet positions is 
commensurate with the population distribution.  Seven of 
the thirty-seven cabinet positions within the new Iraqi 
government are filled by Kurds, including the president of 
Iraq, Jalal Talibani.157  Figure 8 (below) shows the 
positions and party affiliation of the Kurds within the 
major positions of the Iraqi government.   
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President of Iraq Jalal Talibani PUK 
Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for National 
Securiy Affairs 
Barham Salih PUK 
Environment Minister Narmin Uthman PUK 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Hoshyar Zebari KDP 
Minister of Housing and 
Reconstruction 
Bayan Diza’i KDP 
Minister of Industry and 
Minerals 
Fawzi al-Hariri KDP 
Minister of Water Resources Abd al-Latif Rashid PUK 
State Minister (without 
portfolio) 
Ali Muhammad Ahmad KIU 






Table 2.   Kurdish Members of 2006 Iraqi Government159 
 
Overall, the Iraqi region of Kurdistan remains 
relatively untouched by the current war in Iraq.  In fact, 
Iraqi Kurdistan is actually showing signs of prosperity.  
With this new-found prosperity, there are some signs of 
renewed nationalism and the reestablishment of Kurdish 
culture.   
 The KRG flag is one way in which Iraqi Kurds are 
expressing their cultural differences from the rest of 
Iraq.  The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) refuses to 
fly the Iraqi flag over its buildings because the Iraqi 
flag has the phrase “Allah Akbar” (God is Greatest), 
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demonstrating the lack of separation of church and state.160  
Instead, the Kurds are flying their own KRG flag.  The 
symbol on the KRG flag is a twenty-one ray sun disk, which 
“has long religious and cultural history among the Kurds, 
stretching to antiquity.”161   
Another reason the Kurds refuse to fly the flag, is as 
a protest against the atrocities they suffered under the 
Ba’ath regime.  The protest is in hopes that the new Iraqi 
government will create a new flag that will “reflect the 
history, geography, struggle, sacrifices, and sufferings of 
all the people of Iraq without any discrimination as 
previous national symbols were about.”162 
A similar symbolic movement is occurring in Kurdish 
schools.  In an effort to reestablish Kurdish culture, 
school names have been changed from Arabic to traditional 
Kurdish names.  These schools are now teaching Kurdish as 
the primary language in the schools with Arabic as a second 
language.163   
What might seem like minor issues on the surface could 
be symbolic enough to spark further nationalistic ideas.  
Rallying behind and supporting the KRG flag may further 
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dissolve some of the internal issues among the Kurds and 
increase harmony throughout the region.  
Iraq’s trade minister, who incidentally is not a Kurd, 
recognizes the importance of stability in the Kurdish 
region of Iraq as it “can be a gateway to Iran and Turkey 
and may act as a distribution and logistics center.”164  The 
question will be whether Iran and Turkey will be receptive 
to a prospering Kurdish region in Iraq.  While it would not 
support an independent Kurdish state, Turkey may welcome a 
stable and prosperous northern Iraq as it would have a 
“direct economic benefit to the restless and disadvantaged 
southeast of Turkey”165   
 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
When analyzing the timeline of the Iraqi Kurds in the 
context of the individual, the state, and within the 
international system, it is clear that the Kurds in Iraq 
have made significant progress maturing politically.  
Progress at the individual level is demonstrated through 
the success of individuals such as Mahmoud Barzanji, 
Mustafa Barzani, Masoud Barzani, and Jalal Talibani.  
Within the state structure, the formation of and the 
dominance of the two key Kurdish political parties, the KDP 
and PUK,  culminating in the formation and functionality of 
the KRG, demonstrate a great deal of achievement toward 
common goals.  Internationally, however, the Kurds have not 
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made significant progress.  Although their plight is now 
more widely known, circumstances still do not warrant the 
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V. U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND 
HOW THEY RELATE TO THE IRAQI KURDS 
Up to this point, this thesis has utilized the three 
levels of analysis to demonstrate how the prospects for 
statehood for the Kurds of Iraq have evolved.  This chapter 
will depart from the levels of analysis to discuss how 
Iraqi Kurdish independence could impact U.S. foreign policy 
in the region.   
The conclusion drawn from analyzing the Iraqi Kurds at 
the individual level, the state level, and within the 
international system is that statehood remains unlikely.  
This is not to say it should be dismissed completely.  
Though the current prospects for statehood have increased 
greatly in terms of the first two levels of analyses, they 
still need international support.  Thus, the KRG has 
conceded that independence is not viable within the 
“current geopolitical circumstances” and has decided 
maintaining their autonomy within Iraq is the most logical 
course of action.166   
 
A. WHY THE U.S. SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN 
INDEPENDENT IRAQI KURDISTAN 
 
The situation in Iraq is not yet completely stable.  
With new elections in the U.S. coming in November this 
year, the certainty of American troops remaining in Iraq is 
unknown.  Should the United States decide to conduct a 
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complete withdraw of troops in Iraq, there is no guarantee 
that the Iraqi government will be able to maintain 
stability and security in Iraq.   
With its 2003 invasion, the U.S. accomplished the 
elimination of the legitimate use of force (the “state”) 
within Iraq.  What is emerging from the ensuing anarchy is 
not the same Iraq.  While the goal of the U.S. was the 
removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath party from power, 
the U.S. has created an entity not yet capable of meeting 
the definition of a state.  Within the context of the 
definition of state from Chapter II of this thesis (“the 
state is an internationally recognized political entity 
encompassing and controlling a territorial boundary or 
nation of people”), the current Iraq would not be a state 
without the presence of outside military forces to help 
maintain security and stability.167   
Using the same definition, the Kurds already meet the 
minimum classification as a state.  Gareth Stansfield 
repeatedly refers to the “de facto state” of Iraqi 
Kurdistan in his book, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political 
Development and Emergent Democracy.168  The KRG and its 
“peshmerga” force are the legitimate force in the three 
Iraqi provinces of Suleimaniah, Irbil, and Dohuk.”169  The 
authorization for the use of the Kurdish militia is granted 
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in the Iraqi constitution as well as the KRG’s Unification 
Agreement, which is similar to a state constitution.   
The Kurds in Iraq have such a high degree of autonomy 
that a complete collapse of the new central Iraqi 
government would create an ideal situation for the 
declaration of their own sovereign state.  Should that 
occur, the United States ought to look at its overall 
foreign policy objectives and determine whether it is in 
the interest of the U.S. to officially recognize or not 
recognize Kurdish statehood.  To come to this decision, 
policy makers must know and understand the views and goals 
of the KRG and examine U.S. foreign policy objectives to 
weigh the pros and cons of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan.   
 
B. THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT VIEWS ON 
INDEPENDENCE 
 
To ascertain the goals of the KRG, an email interview 
was conducted with Mr. Falah Mustafa Bakir, Minister of 
Foreign Relations for the Kurdistan Regional Government.  
Below is an analysis of Minister Bakir’s response to 
several questions regarding the objectives of the KRG.170  
The first question posed to Minister Bakir dealt with 
the obstacles to independence for Iraqi Kurdistan.  His 
comments are consistent with the Kurdish political 
participation in Iraq.  As discussed in Chapter IV, the 
Iraqi Kurds are very active in high positions within the 
Iraqi government.  Such participation demonstrates that the 
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Kurdish leadership is indeed intent on remaining part of a 
unified Iraq.  His statement that the “current geopolitical 
circumstances are not conducive to independence” come to 
the same conclusion drawn in this thesis regarding the 
third level of analysis.171 
Minister Bakir is also adamant that “the KRG is 
committed to the creation of a federal, democratic, 
pluralistic, and secular Iraq.”172  He was also clear that 
the KRG’s “commitment to this experiment is not without 
condition.”173  There are still territorial issues within 
Iraq requiring resolution, which stem from the Arabization 
campaign.  The KRG should be commended for wanting to see 
the issue rectified “in a legal and democratic manner.”174 
The next question focused on international obstacles, 
particularly Iran and Turkey.  Minister Bakir’s answer 
primarily centered upon Turkey.  The PKK and Turkey’s 
concern about its own Kurdish minority are of great concern 
to the KRG.  Turkey has repeatedly crossed the border into 
Iraq to pursue PKK rebels, which infringes upon the 
sovereignty of Iraq and the authority of the KRG.  Minister 
Bakir emphasizes that the KRG is working to assist Turkey 
with the PKK problem, but is hampered by the fact that 
“Ankara refuses to interact on an official level with the 
 
 
                     





KRG.”175  Turkey may not be recognizing the KRG because in 
doing so it would have to recognize its own Kurdish 
minority.   
Aside from the PKK issue, there is positive economic 
interaction between the Iraqi Kurds and Turkey.  Even with 
the recent tensions (with the PKK), Turkey is still the 
Kurdish region’s principle trading partner.  It is the 
belief that “these commercial ties… will encourage future 
government to government interaction.”176 
The peace and relative stability enjoyed in the 
Kurdish region of Iraq is due to the unity and cooperation 
among the dominant Iraqi Kurdish political parties.  It was 
not until the late 1990s and into the present decade that 
the PUK and KDP were able to reach a power sharing 
agreement.  Minister Bakir assures that the “cooperation 
between PUK and KDP has become the standard, and will 
remain so” because “a unified front for the Kurds of Iraq 
is in the best interests of the people.”177  
The final question asked of Minister Bakir referred to 
a 2005 referendum in which 98.5% of the voters favored 
independence.  He points out “there is a difference between 
desiring independence and the practicality of obtaining 
it.”178  To appease the desires of the people, the KRG has 
put an emphasis on “infrastructure development, healthcare, 
education, and economic reforms.”179  By doing so, “the 
                     






KRG’s pragmatic leadership has done a great deal to manage 
the expectations of its people.”180  
Minister Bakir presents an overall positive picture of 
unity among the political parties and greater prosperity 
throughout the Kurdish region of Iraq.  Should there be a 
dramatic shift in circumstances in Iraq, the situation 
could change rapidly for the KRG.  Spontaneous uprisings, 
not inspired by the Kurdish leadership, are not out of the 
question.  As noted in Chapter V of this thesis, uprisings 
such as these have occurred in the past, the last one in 
1991 at the end of the First Gulf War.  This is important 
to note because the situation in all of Iraq could change 
drastically after the next U.S. presidential election.  For 
this reason, it is important for the United States to have 
thoroughly considered the possible ramifications of a 
complete troop withdrawal and plan accordingly. 
 
C. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES 
 
The U.S. has four policy objectives for the Middle 
East.181  The following sections discuss each of these 
objectives as they relate possible U.S. reaction to a 
declaration of independence by the Kurds in Iraq.  
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 1. U.S. Foreign Policy Objective One:  The need to 
forestall foreign powers from exercising undue influence 
and control over the region.182 
 
During the Cold War, the United States and the USSR 
competed as super-powers to dominate the Middle East and 
the world.  With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the U.S. became the world’s sole super-power.  With no 
global challenger, countries have had to cooperate with the 
United States in order to keep their economy strong.  
Moreover, if a country outright opposes the United States 
and its policies, they risk being listed as a “rogue 
state.” 
Objective one has changed to reflect U.S. interests 
and preclude the overbearing influence of other states in 
the region, specifically those considered “rogue states.”  
Countries such as Iran, listed by the United States as one 
of the “axis of evil” states, pose one of the biggest 
threats to security within the region.   
Iran and Turkey also have great concern in the final 
outcome of Iraq, in particular, the final disposition of 
the Kurds, since they also have sizable Kurdish 
populations.  As discussed in the previous chapters, what 
happens with Iraqi Kurdistan has direct relevance to the 
neighboring countries.   
Should the Kurds of Iraq declare independence, it is 
certain that U.S. policy makers would have to take into 
consideration the impact of recognizing or not recognizing 
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the Kurdish state in terms of its long-time strategic ties 
with Turkey.  By recognizing a Kurdish state, the U.S. 
risks alienating Turkey, potentially causing the Turkish-
American alliance to collapse.  The loss of this alliance 
would be devastating to U.S. foreign policy and strategic 
goals in both Europe and the Middle East. 
Iran’s response to Kurdish independence would also be 
of paramount importance to the United States.  Relations 
between the U.S. and Iran are already strained.  Adding 
another source of contention could lead both countries to 
an Iranian-American conflict. 
 
 2. U.S. Foreign Policy Objective Two:  To ensure the 
security of the state of Israel and encourage states in the 
region to reach a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. 
 
The connection between an independent Kurdistan and 
the policy objective of supporting Israel is weak, but does 
exist.  Iran, as with objective one, is the connecting 
factor.  Israel and Iran have never fought a direct war.  
Iran’s support for Hezbullah has sparked several cross-
border incursions by Israel into southern Lebanon, the 
latest occurring in the summer of 2006.  Angering Iran 
would potentially increase the support it gives to 
Hezbullah, causing security issues for Israel. 
Similarly, the Arab states could also take offense to 
a Kurdish state in the region and thus bolster increased 
resistance to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  This 
could be especially true with Syria, who has a sizable 
Kurdish population of its own.  Any support of an 
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independent Kurdish state must take into consideration what 
effects this would have on the radical Islamist groups of 
the Middle East. 
 
 3. U.S. Foreign Policy Objective Three:  Ensure that 
the global economy has access to plentiful and reasonably 
priced oil. 
 
Oil is one of the foremost U.S. foreign policy 
objectives in the Middle East.  Oil is the one natural 
resource that global economy relies upon and the Middle 
East has some of the largest reserves in the world.   
If an independent Iraqi Kurdistan gained control of 
the oil fields in northern Iraq, it would become a major 
competitor in the world’s oil market.  Historically, the 
cities of Mosul, Kirkuk, and the oil-rich surrounding areas 
were predominantly Kurdish.  Arabization, during the 1970s, 
took the majority standing away from the Kurds.183   The 
Kurds wish to reestablish control over this area, creating 
a moderate point of contention between the Arabs and Kurds 
in Iraq today.  
One factor that will need to be taken into account is 
the geography of Iraqi Kurdistan.  It does not have an 
outlet to the sea and thus would require cooperation from 
neighboring states for distribution of its oil to the world 
market.  It is likely that Iran would not cooperate.  
Turkey, on the other hand, could find great economic gain 
                     
183 Nader Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1992, 74-75.   
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should they cooperate with the Kurds and provide an avenue 
for the oil to the European Union (EU).   
This is not to say that Turkey would support an 
independent Kurdish state if it gained economically, but it 
would certainly help.  One of the factors keeping Turkey 
out of the EU is the Kurdish issue in Turkey.184  One of the 
conditions set by the EU is that Turkey must “grant its 
Kurdish ethnic population its cultural, educational, social 
and political rights.”185  The “lure of EU membership” is 
slowly changing the views in Ankara.186  If cooperation with 
the Kurds from Iraq helps their own internal situation with 
indigenous Turkish Kurds, it is plausible that Ankara may 
find domestic support, especially if it helps Turkey gain 
EU membership.   
 
 4. U.S. Foreign Policy Objective Four:  Encourage 
the spread of democracy in a region that has little 
tradition or background in this form of government. 
 
Of all the U.S. foreign policy objectives for the 
Middle East, the declaration of independence by the Kurds 
of Irag would be the objective that the United States would 
be the most hard-pressed not to support.  The “Kurds are 
not alien to the democratic ideal,” and it could be argued 
that the Kurds are the most developed democratic society in 
the Middle East.187  Gareth Stansfield examines, in depth, 
                     
184 The issue centers on human rights and political equality for the 
Kurds with in the state of Turkey. 
185 Michael M. Gunter, “The Kurds in Iraq,” Middle East Policy 11.1 
(Spring 2004), 108. 
186 Ibid. 
187 Stansfield, 185. 
  67
the origins and the development of the Kurdish political 
system.188  While the system of governance in the KRG is not 
the picture of a perfect democracy, it is the most 
developed democratic system within the region. 
One of the goals of the U.S. in post-Saddam Iraq is 
instituting democratic reforms.  The model of the internal 
development of the Kurdish democratic system is one of the 
supporting factors that show democracy can work in Iraq.  
If democracy cannot take hold in the rest of Iraq, and the 
Kurds declare their independence, it would be hypocritical 
of the United States NOT to support the Kurds. 
Even if the justification of supporting the Kurds lies 
solely in the promotion of democracy, many states in the 
region and throughout the world could see U.S. support of a 
single ethnic group as a blow to their own security.  It is 
not implausible to assume that such support and recognition 
would fuel their own ethnic minorities to strive for 
greater autonomy or independence as well. 
                     
188 Stansfield, 185. 
  68




This purpose of this thesis was to address four 
questions.  The first question was, “Have the Kurds gained 
enough political maturity to declare independence?”  
Analyzing the development of the KRG and the willingness 
for the major political parties to set aside their 
differences and work together clearly demonstrates that the 
Iraqi Kurds have politically matured to the point where 
they could operate as an independent state. 
The answer to the second question, “What level of 
permissiveness for an independent Kurdistan exists among 
the regional powers?” is also clear.  The most important 
regional actors, especially Turkey, will not allow or 
recognize an independent Iraqi Kurdistan as it would 
threaten their national security. 
The consensus among scholars and the Kurdish 
leadership concur with the answer to the third question, 
“What is the possibility that the Iraqi Kurds will declare 
independence from Iraq?”  A declaration of independence by 
the Iraqi Kurds in the foreseeable future is highly 
unlikely.  Although, with such an overwhelming percentage 
of the Kurdish population desiring statehood, it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility for an internal uprising to 
alter the policy of the KRG.   
The United States should consider such a scenario 
possible.  The answer the fourth question, “How should the 
United States shape its foreign policy in the event of such 
a declaration?” is probably the most contentious.  There 
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are valid reasons to support both a decision to recognize 
and not to recognize an independent Kurdistan.   
In the event that circumstances change and the Iraqi 
Kurds decide that independence is in their best interest, 
the United States should support and recognize them.  
Within the context of the U.S. foreign policy objectives 
for the Middle East, stability of the oil and energy 
markets and the promotion of democracy are arguably the 
most important objectives.   
This recognition may not be immediately popular, 
particularly with Turkey.  Their fears of their own 
indigenous Kurds desiring their own autonomy or state is 
not unfounded.  However, that is an internal issue of which 
the Iraqi Kurds have little direct influence.  Intervention 
in Iraqi Kurdistan on Turkey’s part could further stall 
their entrance in the EU, as well as damage its strategic 
alliance with the United States. 
The future of a federalized Iraq is uncertain; 
therefore, multiple options deserve consideration.  The 
model of compromise and cooperation exhibited by the Kurds 
and the KRG will, with any luck, be contagious and spread 
throughout the remainder of Iraq and to other parts of the 
Middle East.   
The application of the three levels of analysis to the 
people and events of the Iraqi Kurdish history provide 
indications that the prospect for a future Kurdish state is 
viable.  Even though the potential exists, a declaration of 
Kurdish independence is still improbable.  Extensive 
changes to the international system are necessary for the 
realization of an independent Iraqi-Kurdistan. 
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APPENDIX: FULL INTERVIEW WITH FALAH MUSTAFA 
BAKIR, MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR THE 
KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNEMNT189 
Question 1: What are the main obstacles to 
independence for Iraqi Kurdistan? 
Independence in order to create a sovereign state 
for the Kurds of Iraq or the Kurds of Turkey, 
Iran and Syria, is not a policy of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government of Iraq. 
The Kurds are the world’s largest nation without 
a homeland, we have sought and been promise 
sovereignty in the past, most notably after World 
War I, and in his heart of heart every Kurd would 
like to see an independent Kurdistan.   
But it is also true that the current geo-
political circumstances are not conducive to 
independence, and that we have publicly and often 
stated that we are not seeking independence.  We 
stand by our pronouncements and assurances.  We 
believe that the best thing for the people of the 
Kurdistan Region is to be a strong region in a 
federal Iraq. 
Our main priority is to recover from decades of 
persecution and neglect under the former regime 
of Saddam Hussein.  We seek this economic, 
cultural and political development not in the 
name in independence, but in order to provide the 




                     
189 Falah Mustafa Bakir, Minister, Head of the Department of Foreign 
Relations, Kurdistan Regional Government, interviewed by Robert Lewis, 
February 29, 2008, via email.  The responses from Minister Bakir are 
unedited. 
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Question 2: The main obstacle to an independent 
Kurdistan appears to be international influences, 
especially with regards to Turkey and Iran.  What can, or 
is, the KRG doing to better its relations with Turkey and 
Iran? 
 
The KRG desires to have good relations across the 
board – governmental, political, commercial, and 
cultural – with all our neighbors. 
The Kurds of Iraq have had longstanding and 
fruitful ties with both Turkey and Iran.   
On a governmental level the KRG enjoys normal 
relations with Iran.  The Iranian consulate is 
one of twelve foreign representation offices (the 
others being Austria, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the Republic of 
Korea, Spain, the Russian Federation, the UK, and 
the US) present in Erbil.  Iran is also a trading 
partner. 
Our relations with Turkey are more complicated.  
There are two main reasons for this: a) the issue 
of the PKK and b) the Kurds inside Turkey who 
some in Ankara believe are inspired by the 
emergence of a semi-autonomous Kurdish across 
their border, inside Iraq. 
The PKK is a serious problem and the KRG is 
dedicated to being an important part of the 
solution.  We have officially condemned the 
violence of the PKK within Turkey and 
commiserated with the families of those affected 
by their actions.  And we are determined that 
territory inside Iraq should not be used to 
launch attacks inside Turkey.  To ensure this 
does not happen we are closely monitoring our 
region’s airports to prevent known PKK members 
entering or leaving.  We have created a cordon 
around areas the remote border areas we suspect 
may contain PKK to prevent the supply of food or 
weapons to the fighters.  We have also closed PKK 
“front” offices operating inside the region.  The 
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KRG also played a key role in securing the safe 
release of the eight Turkish soldiers captured by 
the PKK at the end of last year. 
And we want to do more.  We believe that the 
solution to this problem lies not in military 
action but in diplomatic dialogue and compromise.  
We further believe that the KRG should be 
included in US, Iraqi and Turkish talks on the 
subject.  The KRG is uniquely placed to help 
produce change in the situation. 
However, Ankara refuses to interact on an 
official level with the KRG.  We believe this 
attitude is shortsighted.  The KRG is a de-jure 
part of Iraq – a constitutionally mandated 
regional government, and furthermore we govern 
territory immediately next to Turkey. 
Some in the Turkish military, bureaucracy and 
political establishments view with distaste the 
progress made by the KRG.  However, the new gains 
made recently by the AK Party, a party that the 
record shows is supported by the majority of 
Turkish Kurds, are cause for hope.  The AK Party 
has already made concessions towards the Kurdish 
population in Turkey by removing some of the 
stringent constraints placed on them in the past. 
Social and political measures such as these are 
the real key to neutralizing the militant wing of 
the PKK.  By embracing their Kurdish population, 
and encouraging them to celebrate their culture 
and language, and ensuring economic development, 
the Turkish state can better sustain its unity. 
On a private sector commercial level relations 
between the people of the Kurdistan Region and 
Turkey are robust.  Turkey is our principal 
trading partner and the construction boom taking 
place in the Kurdistan Region is being conducted 
for the most part in cooperation with Turkish 
companies.  This trade is mutually beneficial, as 
illustrated by the fact that even at the height 
of the recent tensions Turkey did not close the 
Harbor border crossing. 
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The KRG is heartened by these commercial ties.  
We believe they will encourage future government 
to government interaction. 
 
Question 3:  Is the KRG absolutely committed to 
working within a federalized Iraq?  Or is the KRG 
conducting its policies to increase its autonomy / chance 
for statehood? 
 
The KRG is committed to the creation of a 
federal, democratic, pluralistic and secular 
Iraq.  Our commitment to this new state is born 
of a belief that after decades of persecution the 
people of this country deserve a better future 
and the tenets mentioned above are the best way 
to secure that future. 
Our commitment to this experiment is not without 
condition.  We have, since the liberation of 
2003, emphasized the importance of resolving the 
situation of the disputed territories inside 
Iraq.  Our demands were recognized by Article 140 
of the Iraq constitution, a constitution voted 
for by the vast majority of Iraqis.  The issue of 
the disputed territories is important because in 
a democracy the people must be given the right to 
chose for themselves who will govern on their 
behalf.  Saddam carried out a campaign of 
Arabization, violently forcing people out of the 
areas, confiscating their lands and houses.  This 
injustice must be rectified.  Rather than resort 
to violence though, we want to return these 
rights in a legal and democratic manner. 
The KRG, its political parties, and its 
leadership work hard to create progress in the 
federal government in Baghdad.  We believe that 
it is time for Iraqis to create change; we can no 




Question 4: Has there been any communication between 
the KRG and the US regarding the possibility of a 
declaration of independence. 
The pursuit of independence is not a KRG policy.  
We are working to create a federal, democratic 
country with a federal system as outlined in the 
preamble of the Iraqi constitution with correct 
power and wealth sharing. 
We welcome talks with the US to discuss the role 
of the Kurds in their wider Middle East policy.  
We are the US’ best friends in the region, we are 
grateful for the liberation and we want to 
develop a long term strategic partnership with 
the US.   
 
Question 5:  During the 1990s, the KDP and PUK fought 
what could be considered a civil war.  By the late 1990s, 
the two parties reached an agreement and appear to be 
working together for the interests of Kurdistan.  Is the 
cooperation between the two dominant parties of the KRG 
likely to continue?  
 
The KRG is a government of unity.  The two 
largest parties, the PUK and the KDP, reached a 
power sharing agreement two years ago and this 
agreement still stands today.  Included in this 
agreement are the smaller parties of the region. 
A unified front for the Kurds of Iraq is in the 
best interests of the people of the Kurdistan 
Region and therefore cooperation between the PUK 
and KDP and other parties has become standard, 





Question 6:  What percentage of the population within 
the three Kurdish provinces favor independence?  According 
to the January 2005 referendum, 98.5% of the voters were in 
favor of independence.  How is the KRG convincing the 
public that independence is still a remote possibility, but 
not in the near future due to outside influences? 
 
The referendum showed that a large proportion of 
people in the Kurdistan Region were pro 
independence.  However, there is a difference 
between desiring independence and the 
practicality of obtaining it.  The KRG 
understands this, and so do the people of the 
region.  The KRG’s pragmatic leadership has done 
a great deal to manage the expectations of its 
people in this regard.   
The Kurdistan Region is experiencing the greatest 
period of prosperity in its long history.  There 
is much work still to be done, and by no means 
has the KRG created a situation without problems.  
But we are working in partnership with our people 
and our friends in the international community to 
create a better life.  Our highest priority is to 
concentrate on infrastructure development, 
healthcare, education and economic reforms. 
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